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Courts and Censorship
Hans A. Linde*
L INTRODUCTION
For half a century conventional wisdom in the United
States has equated freedom of speech and of the press with its
protection by courts under the first amendment. From its mod-
est beginning in Near v. Minnesota,' a widening stream of
Supreme Court decisions has left an impression, not only
among the public and the press itself, but among some lawyers,
that the law of the first amendment and the law of the press are
the same thing. First amendment jurisprudence indeed has en-
veloped some areas of private and public law to the point
where the Constitution is not seen as a limit on the outer reach
of substantive law, but rather the substantive law is assumed
to reach whatever the first amendment does not protect. This
happened in the 1940s to the law of picketing and twenty years
later to defamation law and to the regulation of salacious en-
tertainment. Anyone who deals with the laws of copyright, of
securities regulation, of broadcast licensing, of fraud and per-
jury and conspiracy needs no reminder that numerous issues
of law and policy ordinarily precede the rare constitutional is-
sue. But in the public folklore of our time, the first amendment
is the law of expression and the judges are its guardians.
The first amendment has served well in the hands of
judges committed to freedom of expression, but that freedom is
not well served by singleminded concentration on the first
amendment as its first rather than its final protection nor on
the courts as the single source of its governing law. This single-
minded concentration on the first amendment needlessly
foregoes other principles and sources of law.
Concentration on the first amendment began by tran-
scending the barriers of federalism, not without good reason,
but at a price both in the shaping of first amendment doctrine
* Associate Justice, Oregon Supreme Court. Judge Linde's Article re-
tains its original format as prepared for an audience of journalists and histori-
ans, as well as legal scholars.
1. 283 U.S. 693 (1931).
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and in the independent potential of state constitutions. Preoc-
cupation with the first amendment often leaps over familiar
principles of the allocation of lawmaking, at needless cost both
to lawmaking and to the development of constitutional law.
Moreover, having learned to see judges as their guardians
against censorship, the champions of free expression forget
that in American law, courts were the original censors, and
they turn from the courts to lawmakers only when burdened
with the handicap of a lost first amendment claim.
One result has been the growth of first amendment doc-
trine in directions that leave courts with incompatible func-
tions. Too often the prevailing doctrine casts the judge in the
image of Janus, one face toward the task of making law for the
situation at hand, the other toward enforcing the constitutional
bar against laws that encroach on freedom of expression.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Near v. Minnesota touches
all these themes, though it became famous for its anathema
against prior restraints. Laymen concerned with the press and
its freedom, and some of their lawyers, need to be aware of the
complexities and the occasional paradoxes that lurk behind
this and other formulas of the familiar first amendment rheto-
ric and rethink their implications. Although rhetoric nowhere
plays a more fitting role than in the law of public speech, to
serve as law a formula must be precise enough to direct, rather
than to decorate, judicial decision making.
In the following remarks, I first review the stunted devel-
opment of freedom of the press under the state constitutions
and under the fourteenth amendment. Next I turn to the case
of Near v. Minnesota and the doctrinal problems created by the
Supreme Court's opinion, particularly by its obiter dicta. Fi-
nally, I suggest an alternative view in which courts accord con-
stitutional law its classic role in the censorship of laws rather
than in the censorship of expression.
H. STATE GUARANTEES OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
It is easy to forget how new most first amendment law is.
When the State of Minnesota in 1928 moved to suppress the
scandalous Saturday Press as a public nuisance, the earliest
Supreme Court opinions now regarded as the starting point of
first amendment doctrine were hardly a decade old, and of
course they dealt with federal prosecutions and were mostly
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dissents.2 But this is not to say that the law of freedom of
speech and of the press was not constitutional law. It was law
under state constitutions, before and along with their federal
counterpart.
Since Minnesota became a state in 1858, its constitution
had promised: '"The liberty of the press shall forever remain in-
violate, and all persons may freely speak, write and publish
their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of such right."'3 It is one of several classic formulations
found in the states' declarations of rights.4 Far from reflecting
a state's wish to copy the august first amendment, the exist-
ence of such guarantees in the original states had forced its ad-
dition to the Federal Constitution. By 1928, freedom of speech
and of the press had been constitutional law in the states for a
hundred and fifty years, at least on paper, but it was not first
amendment law.
Nor did the constitutional guarantees assure much freedom
for speech or writing of the kind that a court or legislature
would think fit to suppress. From the first, judges assumed that
these guarantees had no effect on their powers to punish publi-
cations as contempts or as common law crimes. In 1788, when a
Philadelphia printer named Oswald published an address to
the public, claiming that he had been arrested at the instigation
of federalist adversaries "whose sentiments upon the new con-
stitution have not in every respect coincided with mine", and
resting his trust in a jury of his fellow citizens, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court thought that state's guarantee of a free
press presented no obstacle to punishing him for a contempt in
seeking to prejudice future jurors.5 Reviewing the history of
freedom of the press in the United States, Professor Henry
Schofield in 1914 deplored the characteristic reaction of com-
mon law courts to assume that a codified text means to do no
2. E.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
3. MMN. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 3.
4. Similar provisions may be found in the original constitutions of the fol-
lowing states: ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. II, § 7; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I §§ 5-6;
FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. I § 5; IDAHO CONST., art. I § 9; IOWA CONST. of 1846, art.
I, § 7; KAN. CONST., Bill of Rts., § 11; KY. CONST. of 1796, art. XII, § 7; Mo. CoNST.
of 1865, art. I, § 27; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. I, § 10; NEB. CONST., art. I, § 5;
NEV. CONST., art. I, § 9; N.M. CONST., art. II, § 17; N.D. CONST. of 1889, art. I, § 9;
OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 6; RI. CONST. of 1841, art. I, § 18; S.D. CONST.,
art. VI, § 5; TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 19; TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. I, § 5; WIs.
CONST., art. I, § 3.
5. Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319, 319 (Pa. 1788).
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more than restate the common law, leaving the court to carry
on as before: "Our own judges seem to have forgotten that the
founders of the government are not distinguished for their re-
ception of the English common law but for their adaptation of
the democratic leaning and tendency of the constitutional side
of it to a new career of popular freedom and equal justice."6 It
remains true today that even a revolutionary text can be read
for how much of the familiar it enshrines rather than how
much it means to change.
It soon became accepted dogma that constitutional free-
dom of the press meant freedom from licensing and prepublica-
tion censorship. Yet if that alone was intended, a draftsman
would be rather more enthusiastic than competent to write that
"[t]he liberty of the press shall forever remain inviolate, and
all persons may freely speak, write and publish their senti-
ments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such
right"7; and the eighteenth century draftsmen were not incom-
petents. Plainly, such a text intended a right of free expression
beyond freedom from licensing. How could freedom of expres-
sion nevertheless be legally restrained?
One obvious way was a broad reading of the words "re-
sponsible" and "abuse," permitting the authorities to define
and punish "abuse." The exercise of "liberty" of the press was
virtuous and protected by the guarantee, but "licentiousness"
was wicked and unprotected. By the time the suit to suppress
the Saturday Press reached the Minnesota Supreme Court in
State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford,s that court could comfortably
add one more to a string of recent precedents which permitted
publications to be forbidden by such reasoning. In 1906, Sena-
tor Patterson of Colorado, publisher of two Denver newspapers,
was held in contempt by the Colorado Supreme Court for pub-
lishing articles and cartoons which accused that court of parti-
san decisions in a political election battle.9 In 1912, the State of
Washington convicted one Fox of a publication tending to en-
6. Schofleld, Freedom of the Press in the United States, 9 AA. Soc. Soc'y
Ploc. 67, 83 (1914), reprinted in 2 H. SCHOFELD, ESSAYS ON CONSTInTONAL
LAW AND EQurrY AND OTHER SUBJECTS 510, 530 (1921).
7. MINN. CONT., art. L § 3.
8. 174 Minn. 457, 219 N.W. 770 (1928), rev'd sub nom., Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931). The story of the Saturday Press, its antecedents, and its
entry into constitutional history is fascinatingly told in F. FRENDLY, MINNESOTA
RAG (1981).
9. People ex rel Attorney Gen. v. News-Times Publishing Co., 35 Colo.
253, 84 P. 912 (1906), writ of error dismissed sub nom., Patterson v. Colorado ex
reL Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
[Vol. 66:171
COURTS AND CENSORSHIP
courage crime or disrespect for law, namely an article in favor
of nudism.' 0 Four years later the same state sustained a con-
viction for libeling the memory of George Washington, which
the court distinguished from "historical criticism made in good
faith in a temperate manner."'1 The Minnesota court itself had
allowed a prosecution under a statute that prohibited any
newspaper from publishing an account of the details of an exe-
cution, though the account was otherwise unobjectionable:
"[I] f, in the opinion of the legislature, it is detrimental to public
morals to publish anything more than the mere fact that the
execution has taken place, then, under the authorities and
upon principle, the appellant was not deprived of any constitu-
tional right in being so limited."' 2 In the newly begun Minne-
sota Law Review, Dean W. R. Vance had written that
restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press should not
be expanded beyond those recognized at common law, but as
to those, he saw no good reason why a publication should not
be enjoined before the fact to forestall harm that could not be
repaired by subsequent punishment.13
Not all decisions took a narrow view of freedom from cen-
sorship. The Nebraska Supreme Court lifted a restraining or-
der obtained by a politician against newspaper publication of
his earlier statement denying his candidacy:
The powerful agency of the press in the evolution of just and effi-
cient government and the indefensible restrictions imposed upon pub-
lishers were understood generally when provisions similar to those
quoted from the Nebraska Constitution were inserted in the fundamen-
tal law of many of the states. In the light of history, some of the lead-
ing purposes disclosed by the language of the Constitution cannot be
misunderstood. The power to exercise a censorship over political pub-
lications, as formerly practiced, is taken away. The exercise of censor-
ship by a court of equity through the writ of injunction is no less
objectionable than the exercise of that function by other departments
of the government.
1 4
The Minnesota Supreme Court brushed aside such objec-
tions in the case of the politically scandalous and defamatory
Saturday Press. The legislature had provided that anyone in
the business of publishing or circulating such a newspaper
could be enjoined from publishing or circulating material of the
10. State v. Fox, 71 Wash. 185, 127 P. 1111, (1912), aff'd, 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
11. State v. Haffner, 94 Wash. 136, 143, 162 P. 45, 48 (1916).
12. State v. Pioneer Press Co., 100 Minn. 173, 177, 110 N.W. 867, 868-69
(1907).
13. Vance, Freedom of Speech and of the Press, 2 Mnm. L. REV. 239, 249-50
(1918).
14. Howell v. Bee Pub. Co., 100 Neb. 39, 41, 158 N.W. 358, 359 (1916).
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same kind, after a hearing in which it would be a defense "that
the truth was published with good motives and for justifiable
ends.' 5 The court's opinion deserves quoting as a summation
of the conventional judicial view of freedom of the press in
1928:
The liberty of the press consists in the right to publish the truth with
impunity, with good motives, and for justifiable ends; liberty to publish
with complete immunity from legal censure and punishment for the
publication, so long as it is not harmful in its character when tested by
such standards as the law affords. The constitutional protection meant
the abolition of censorship and that governmental permission or li-
cense was not to be required, and indeed our constitution... gave the
individual freedom to act-but to act properly or within legal rules of
propriety.... In Minnesota no agency can hush the sincere and hon-
est voice of the press; but our constitution was never intended to pro-
tect malice, scandal, and defamation when untrue or published with
bad motive or without justifiable ends. It is a shield for the honest,
careful, and conscientious press.... There is a legal obligation on the
part of all who write and publish to do so in such a manner as not to
offend against public decency, public morals, and public laws.
16
For good measure, the court recited: "It is the liberty of the
press that is guaranteed-not the licentiousness."' 7
This was the prevailing state of the law when a majority of
the United States Supreme Court embarked on extending pro-
tection under the Federal Constitution against infringements of
freedom of speech and of the press by the laws of the several
states. In retrospect, the simple formulas of "liberty" and "li-
cense," and of "freedom" and its "abuse," appear naive. So
does the invocation of truth, sincerity, honesty, and justifiable
ends as legal tests for freedom without any apparent concern
about the deterring effect of anticipating that these qualities
might be submitted to a court's or a jury's judgment. We no
longer share the earlier judges' confidence in their own ser-
monizing nor in the unquestioned righteousness of their own or
the community's judgment. Still, it is a fair question whether
modern first amendment doctrine deals more clearly with the
relevance of truth and motives and the legitimacy of ends.
A different evolution of freedom of expression under the
state constitutions was not precluded, but it was not likely to
happen in the absence of Supreme Court leadership under the
first amendment. Not only the failure of state courts but the
vulnerability of a nationally distributed press to liability under
15. Act of Apr. 20, 1925, ch. 285, § 1, 1925 Minn. Laws 358.
16. State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 174 Minn. 457, 462-63, 219 N.W. 770, 772
(1928), rev'd sub nom, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
17. Id. at 463, 219 N.W. at 773.
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the standards of individual states required the extension of na-
tional protection of press freedom against state infringement.18
Once that extension occurred, however, the states' own consti-
tutional guarantees practically disappeared from sight. In con-
stitutional law, state courts that previously struggled to work
out their own theories generally adopt the formulas of the
Supreme Court once it enters the field, in part because thereaf-
ter counsel will argue nothing else.
Yet though freedom of expression owes its modern scope
to federal decisions, the states' constitutional guarantees them-
selves did not disappear, and nothing precludes their further
application independent of the first amendment. On the
Supreme Court of Oregon, for example, we have repeatedly
held that we need not and will not reach a question under the
first amendment when the challenged law fails the test of the
state's Bill of Rights.'9 Oregon's guarantee, somewhat different
from Minnesota's, provides: "No law shall be passed re-
straining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right
to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but
every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right."20
This text does not invite a verbal distinction between "liberty
of the press" and "licentiousness;" in fact, it does not single out
the press as an institution.2 ' The qualification "responsible for
abuse," the Oregon court recently held, means responsibility to
a private party "for injury done him in his person, property,
and reputation," a remedy which itself is guaranteed elsewhere
in the Bill of Rights. But we held that this responsibility could
not in Oregon extend beyond compensation for actual injury to
allow punitive damages for defamation, although punitive dam-
ages are not barred by the Supreme Court's decisions under
the first amendment.22
Without the opinions of Brandeis and Black and those who
followed them to write for the Supreme Court, the state consti-
tutions might never have recovered from Blackstone and Kent,
18. See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
19. E.g., State v. Spencer, 289 Or. 225, 228, 611 P.2d 1147, 1148 (1980); Deras
v. Myers, 272 Or. 47, 53, 535 P.2d 541, 544 (1975).
20. OR. CONST., art. I, § 8.
21. E.g., State ex rel Oregonian Publishing Co. v. Deiz, 289 Or. 277, 613 P.2d
23, 28-9 (1980) (Linde, J., concurring).
22. Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 119, 593 P.2d 777, 788 (1979). The language
quoted in the text is from On. CoNsT., art. I, § 10, which provides: "No court
shall be secret, but justice shall be administered, openly and without purchase,
completely and without delay, and every man shall have remedy by due course
of law for injury done him in his person, property, or reputation."
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Cooley and Story. State courts, of course, cannot extend first
amendment freedoms where the Supreme Court does not.
Nothing but the singleminded focus on that amendment, how-
ever, prevents making principled arguments to a state court
why the state's own standards respect the claimed freedom
apart from any federal constraint.
]II. NEAR'S ANTECEDENTS
Though there were good reasons to transcend the barriers
of federalism and to hold the states to first amendment stan-
dards, the manner in which this was done affected first amend-
ment doctrine itself.
The first amendment itself, of course, was not directed
against state laws. James Madison proposed and the House of
Representatives included such a provision in the original Bill
of Rights, but the Senate eliminated it. What remained was the
prohibition that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a re-
dress of grievances." Only the nationalization of citizenship in
consequence of the Civil War offered an opportunity to explore
what rights of political expression, at least, national citizenship
might place beyond local interference.
The first sentence of the fourteenth amendment defined na-
tional citizenship and forbade the states to "make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States." The Supreme Court soon vitiated
the force of this clause in its first case under the amendment.2 3
Seeking to show that the Court's opinion had not drained the
clause of all meaning, Justice Miller cited "the right to peacea-
bly assemble and petition for redress of grievances" among the
"rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution."24
The only part of the Federal Constitution referring to assembly
and petition, of course, is the same first amendment that guar-
antees freedom of the press.
This promising dictum, however, did not bear fruit. Having
destroyed the privileges and immunities clause, the Court later
manhandled the due process clause into service to meet persis-
tent demands for judicial protection of business from state reg-
23. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873).
24. Id.
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ulation, quite divorced from any question of process.25 Thus
bereft of the contours of its text or of its original significance,
the due process clause provided only the swampiest grounds
for substantive scrutiny of state policies, on which the Court
proceeded to erect such formulas as whether a state law was a
"reasonable" exercise of the "police power" for public health,
morals, or welfare. This was the available judicial theory when
freedom of expression sought a constitutional refuge from the
states. Ironically, the lead on the Court eventually had to come
from those Justices most hostile to the notion of "substantive
due process."
Contrary to the later mythology, Justice Holmes, who had
little use for this notion, was more hindrance than help. When
Colorado's Senator Patterson tried to appeal his contempt con-
viction, Holmes, then recently transplanted from the Massachu-
setts to the federal bench, wrote for the Court in dismissing
Patterson's objections for lack of a federal question.26 Holmes's
opinion, however, proceeded in dicta to reassert the old line of
Oswald's case 27 between "previous restraints" and punishment
for contempt for obstructing the administration of justice.28
Only the indomitable and prescient John Marshall Harlan dis-
sented on constitutional grounds. Because Harlan's analysis is
all but forgotten in today's constitutional teaching, it deserves
to be quoted at length:
Now, the Fourteenth Amendment declares, in express words, that
'no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States.' As the First
Amendment guaranteed the rights of free speech and of a free press
25. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ...." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
26. Patterson v. Colorado ex reL. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
27. Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319 (Pa. 1788).
28. We leave undecided the question whether there is to be found in
the Fourteenth Amendment a prohibition similar to that in the First.
But even if we were to assume that freedom of speech and freedom of
the press were protected from abridgement on the part not only of the
United States but also of the States, still we should be far from the con-
clusion that the plaintiff in error would have us reach. In the first
place, the main purpose of such constitutional provisions is 'to prevent
all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practised by
other governments,' and they do not prevent the subsequent punish-
ment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare. The
preliminary freedom extends as well to the false as to the true; the sub-
sequent punishment may extend as well to the true as to the false.
This was the law of criminal libel apart from statute in most cases, if
not in all. In the next place, the rule applied to criminal libels applies
yet more clearly to contempts.
Patterson v. Colorado ex reL Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (emphasis
in original) (citations omitted).
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against hostile action by the United States, it would seem clear that
when the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the States from impairing
or abridging the privileges of citizens of the United States it necessar-
ly prohibited the States from impairing or abridging the constitutional
rights of such citizens to free speech and a free press. But the court
announces that it leaves undecided the specific question whether there
is to be found in the Fourteenth Amendment a prohibition as to the
rights of free speech and a free press similar to that in the First. It yet
proceeds to say that the main purpose of such constitutional provisions
was to prevent all such 'previous restraints' upon publications as had
been practiced by other governments, but not to prevent the subse-
quent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public
welfare. I cannot assent to that view, if it be meant that the legislature
may impair or abridge the rights of a free press and of free speech
whenever it thinks that the public welfare requires that to be done.
The public welfare cannot override constitutional privileges, and if the
rights of free speech and of a free press are, in their essence, attributes
of national citizenship, as I think they are, then neither Congress nor
any State since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment can, by
legislative enactments or by judicial action, impair or abridge them. In
my judgment the action of the court below was in violation of the rights
of free speech and a free press as guaranteed by the Constitution.
2 9
Holmes wrote again for the Court to sustain Fox's conviction
for publishing his defense of nudism, but by then he only had
to hold that the Washington statute was not too vague for due
process. Liberty of the press was not even mentioned.30
The following year, Louis Brandeis joined the Court. Fa-
mous for his briefs in defense of state social legislation, Bran-
deis was no friend of substantive due process. A Minnesota
case predating Near provided an occasion to consider whether
the Federal Constitution protected freedom of expression in
the states. Joseph Gilbert, a leader of the Nonpartisan League,
made a speech against American participation in World War I
and was convicted under a statute making it a crime to discour-
age military enlistment. The Minnesota Supreme Court saw no
violation of the state's constitutional guarantee of freedom to
speak one's sentiments on all subjects.31 In the United States
Supreme Court, a majority found Gilbert's criticism of the mo-
tives of the war to be beyond the limits of free speech an-
nounced in similar decisions under the Federal Espionage
Act,32 again without deciding whether the Constitution pro-
tected freedom of speech against state impairment at all. 3 3 In
29. Id. at 464-65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
30. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
31. State v. Gilbert, 142 Minn. 495, 171 N.W. 798 (1919) (per curiam).
32. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920) (citing Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)).
33. Id. at 332. Accord, Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
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dissent, Brandeis asserted that the right to speak freely on na-
tional policies was a privilege or immunity of national citizen-
ship even before the fourteenth amendment, which that
amendment merely reaffirmed; like Harlan, he cited the earlier
reference to the right of assembly and petition in the Slaughter-
House Cases.3 4 As for the due process clause, he contrasted
the Court's denial of liberty to criticize the war with its readi-
ness to find in that clause a right to contract for insurance, to
discharge union workers, or to conduct an employment agency,
ending bitterly, "I cannot believe that the liberty guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment includes only liberty to acquire
and to enjoy property."35
On this point, at least, Brandeis had made some headway
by 1927, when he published his famous concurring opinion in
Whitney v. California.36 By then the Court had "assumed"
that freedom of speech and of the press were among the "liber-
ties" protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, though, like the other examples of such liberties,
subject to "reasonable" state regulation in the exercise of the
state's so-called "police power."37 Brandeis was not reconciled
to "substantive due process," but in Whitney he abandoned the
battle over premises and, now joined by Holmes, fought only
for proof of incitement and immediate serious danger before
(1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919). The Court thought it
clear that Gilbert could not claim a defense of truth for his attack on the mo-
tives of the war:.
It was not declared in aggression, but in defense, in defense of our na-
tional honor, in vindication of the 'most sacred rights of our Nation and
our people.'
This was known to Gilbert for he was informed in affairs and the
operations of the Government, and every word that he uttered in de-
nunciation of the war was false, was deliberate misrepresentation of
the motives which impelled it, and the objects for which it was prose-
cuted. He could have had no purpose other than that of which he was
charged. It would be a travesty on the constitutional privilege he in-
vokes to assign him its protection.
254 U.S. at 333 (footnote omitted).
34. Id. at 337-38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis also cited the repeti-
tion of the same dictum in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).
254 U.S. at 338 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
35. 254 U.S. at 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis referred to
the following decisions: Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917); Coppage v. Kan-
sas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
36. 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (prosecution for "criminal syndicalism" in organiz-
ing the Communist Party of California).
37. Id. at 371 (citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666-68 (1925) and
cases cited therein).
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speech can be suppressed.3 8
Thus a Court majority that saw all liberties through the
blurred lens of substantive due process diverted the defense of
freedom of speech and of the press from the first amendment's
clear focus on the invalidity of repressive laws at the time of
enactment and reduced its defenders to litigating the "danger"
of exercising those freedoms in individual cases.3 9 In the early
years of the Roosevelt majority, there was one more revival of
interest in recognizing freedom of speech and freedom of the
press as privileges and immunities of citizens, as Harlan had
argued. It appeared in an opinion by Justice Owen Roberts in
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,40 joined by
Justice Black and in part by Chief Justice Hughes, but it fell
short of a majority. Many years later, the Court went beyond
Brandeis to hold a "criminal syndicalism" law, like California's,
void on its face without reference to the defendant's conduct or
its dangers in the individual case.41 But before then the
Court's adjudication-oriented formulas had shaped and dis-
torted the focus of first amendment doctrine itself.
IV. THE NEAR DECISION
Due process, however, and not the first amendment, still
38. Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me per-
suasive, it is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters
of procedure....
*. . ihenever the fundamental rights of free speech and assembly
are alleged to have been invaded, it must remain open to a defendant
to present the issue whether there actually did exist at the time a clear
danger, whether the danger, if any, was imminent- and whether the evil
pprehended was one so substantial as to justify the stringent restric-
tion interposed by the legislature. The legislative declaration, like the
fact that the statute was passed and was sustained by the highest court
of the State, creates merely a rebuttable presumption that these condi-
tions have been satisfied.
274 U.S. at 373, 378-79.
39. On the same day as the decision in Whitney v. California, the Court
reversed a Kansas IWW organizer's conviction of criminal syndicalism on the
ground that references to a class struggle in the preamble of the Industrial
Workers of the World constitution alone were insufficient evidence of criminal
intentions. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
40. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). Frankfurter and Douglas, JJ., did not participate.
Stone, J., concurred in the judgment, joined by Reed, J., and McReynolds, J.
Butler, J., separately dissented. See also Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941), in which Justices Black and Murphy joined with Justices Douglas and
Jackson in finding a national privilege of interstate travel and migration, which
the majority rested on the commerce clause.
41. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
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was the formal premise for reviewing state convictions of
speakers or editors when Minnesota's injunction against the
Saturday Press reached the Supreme Court in 1931. Two pro-
positions made Near v. Minnesota a landmark decision. The
first was the announcement in Chief Justice Hughes's majority
opinion that "[ift is no longer open to doubt that the liberty of
the press, and of speech, is within the liberty safeguarded by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from in-
vasion by state action."42 In preceding opinions, this proposi-
tion had only been assumed for purposes of argument. After
Near, decisions defining these liberties against state and local
governments came to define them also against the federal gov-
ernment under the first amendment and vice versa.
The proposition for which Near v. Minnesota became fa-
mous was the second: that liberty of the press precluded "pre-
vious restraints," not only in the form of licensing or
prepublication censorship, but also in the form of judicial in-
junctions against publication of material that would not be priv-
ileged against subsequent penalties. On this issue the Near
Court divided five to four.
The disagreement was over the character of Minnesota's in-
junction more than over major premises. The majority con-
cluded that by enjoining future issues of yet unpublished
content, thus placing on the publisher the burden of defending
its truth and good motives, the court's order "not only operates
to suppress the offending newspaper or periodical but to put
the publisher under an effective censorship." 43 The dissenters
argued that the Minnesota court enjoined only publication of
further material of a kind that was conceded or properly ad-
judged to be defamatory and unprivileged; the order left the
Saturday Press free to publish anything that it believed it
could defend in a possible contempt proceeding as not being of
the same nature. This did not resemble the advance control by
licensers and censors that was meant by the phrase "previous
restraint."
Enthusiasm for Near v. Minnesota as a landmark of liberty
is sobered by how much was conceded on the way to achieving
its formal establishment of liberty of speech and of the press
42. 283 U.S. at 707. In the oral argument, however, Chief Justice Hughes
reportedly told counsel that he need not argue further whether or not freedom
of the press was a privilege or immunity under the fourteenth amendment, be-
cause "prior decisions of the court so held it." See F. FRINDLY, supra note 8, at
129.
43. 283 U.S. at 712.
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under the fourteenth amendment and the doctrine against pre-
vious restraints. Near added nothing to the substance of free
expression; if anything, it sacrificed some substance to gain its
major goal. Holmes, who had written Patterson v. Colorado"
twenty-five years earlier, was essential to a majority, and his
dicta in Patterson are duly repeated: The main purpose of the
constitutional guarantees is to prevent previous restraints, not
to prevent the subsequent punishment of such publications "as
may be deemed contrary to the public welfare."45
[I]t is recognized that punishment for the abuse of the liberty accorded
to the press is essential to the protection of the public, and that the
common law rules that subject the libeler to responsibility for the pub-
lic offense, as well as for the private injury, are not abolished by the
protection extended in our constitutions.... The law of criminal libel
rests upon that secure foundation. There is also the conceded author-
ity of courts to punish for contempt when publications directly tend to
prevent the proper discharge of judicial functions.4 6
There was a genuine and important difference of principle
between the majority and the dissent insofar as Near could
fairly be read to foreclose any intervention, by courts as well as
executive agencies, before actual publication of material that
would be subject to subsequent sanctions. Such a constitu-
tional principle would have far-reaching implications. But it,
too, was deeply qualified in the very act of announcing it: "The
objection has also been made that the principle as to immunity
from previous restraint is stated too broadly, if every such re-
straint is deemed to be prohibited. That is undoubtedly true;
the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely
unlimited."47 There followed dicta which seemed again to
equate the question of previous restraint with the question of
limits on the substance of what might freely be said or written,
dicta which, almost in passing, assumed a denial of such free-
dom as to subjects of speech and press-sex and military oper-
ations-that the Court in fact had not decided.48 Their sequel
occupies most of our remaining discussion.
Near stands as a warning against a common tactic-to seek
assent to a principle by conceding limits on its reach that may
sound obvious in dicta but are not before the court. To counsel
44. 205 U.S. 454 (1907). See text accompanying note 26 supra.
45. 283 U.S. at 714 (quoting Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen., 205
U.S. 454, 462 (1907)).
46. 1& at 715 (citing, among others, Patterson v. Colorado ex rel Attorney
Gen., 205 U.S. 454 (1907) and Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319 (Pa.
1788)).
47. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 715-16.
48. Id at 716.
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who has only the immediate case to win, such concessions are
irresistible when a court probes for the implications of his or
her claim. After the argument, they can be forgotten, and
should be. In Supreme Court opinions, however, such limiting
dicta often will appear to be necessary to the principle itself
and later rise to overwhelm it when the occasion actually
arises. This happened after Near v. Minnesota.
V. THE LEGACY OF NEAR v. MINNESOTA
Near left two legacies: the principle against previous re-
straints and the dicta that excluded some subjects from the
constitutional freedom of speech and of the press.
A. PREVIOUS REsTRAINTs
The rule against previous or, as it is now more often called,
prior restraint entered modern Supreme Court doctrine under
the aegis of history rather than logic or policy, at a time when
accepted notions of freedom of speech and of the press ex-
cluded most anything offensive enough to invite actual sup-
pression and punishment. When so much expression was in
substance outside constitutional protection, the Supreme
Court's announcement that even punishable publication could
not be restrained in advance was a famous victory. Near prom-
ised to bar attempts to censor publications which, once pub-
lished, could be penalized but in fact might not be. In time,
however, the meaning of the victory and its logic proved less
obvious.
The questions of meaning and of logic can be quickly sum-
marized. A law that prohibits specified kinds of publication
under threat of a penalty, such as an ordinary criminal law, is
meant to restrain the publication. Its object is to prevent pub-
lication, not to impose punishment. The law is not frustrated
when no publication, and therefore no punishment, occurs; to
the contrary, it has served its purpose. Why, then, is an order
directed to the publisher of the Saturday Press not to publish
scandalous and defamatory lies more or less a "prior" restraint
than a criminal law against publishing such material?49 Neither
49. The doctrine's potential for confusion is shown by State ex rel. Daily
Mail Publishing Co. v. Smith, 248 S.E.2d 269 (W. Va. 1978), in which the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals treated a criminal prohibition against pub-
lishing the names of juvenile delinquents as a prior restraint forbidden by the
first amendment, and the state did not challenge that characterization on writ
of certiorari. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the first amendment
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form of law achieves physical prevention; the determined
speaker or writer may choose to publish and suffer the conse-
quences. Moreover, if the material is of a kind that one has no
freedom to speak or publish, material that the law may rightly
suppress or punish, then why, English history aside, should the
law regard mere differences in the form of threatened sanctions
as the essence of liberty?
Long before Near v. Minnesota, Roscoe Pound concluded
that there was no good reason against enjoining a threatened
libel or invasion of another's privacy in advance of the first
publication in order to prevent irreparable harm.5 0 His implicit
assumption, of course, was that an injunction is a stronger de-
terrent than tort law, an assumption which the difference be-
tween civil damages and punishment for contempt makes
plausible. When the alternative to punishment for contempt is
criminal punishment, that difference is less apparent. Indeed,
once the potential sanctions are equal, it can be argued that a
prepublication restraining order, after full and fair procedures,
can be more narrowly drawn for the occasion than a general
statute and thus can pose a lesser risk to a publisher, including
less risk of overcautious self-censorship. Yet precisely the
specter of writers, publishers, or theatrical and film producers
tempted to seek safety in prepublication clearance is what
gives us pause.
In the mid-1950s, at a difficult time for the first amendment,
Professor Thomas Emerson undertook a systematic defense of
the doctrine against prior restraint.5 1 He observed that the con-
cept remained "curiously confused and unformed," loosely em-
bracing different types of regulations that range from licensing
laws and permit requirements to laws disqualifying proponents
of unsound views from various occupations, benefits, or serv-
ices. 52 Without repeating Emerson's analysis in detail, it may
holding without endorsing West Virginia's view of prior restraints. Smith v.
Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
50. Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation, 29 HARv. L. REV. 640, 654-
55 (1916). The leading decision denying such preventive relief was Brandreth v.
Lance, 8 Paige Ch. 24 (N.Y. 1839).
51. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 L & CoNTEMP. PRo,. 648
(1955).
52. Id. at 649. Loyalty oaths or secrecy oaths prior to employment, access
to benefits, or access to information also are previous restraints against forbid-
den expression. In Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), the Supreme
Court held that an obligation not to publish without prior agency review led to
a forfeiture of the author's royalties by imposition of constructive trust in favor
of the government. Of course, this sanction is an ineffectual gesture when the
publication is not for the sake of profit.
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be said that he found the greatest value of the doctrine against
prior restraints in barring the kind of administrative censorship
whose institutional dynamics are those of much single-purpose
administration: a tendency to expand in coverage, zealous or
wooden enforcement, a predilection for the easy adverse deci-
sion, low public visibility, and limited independent review.
This indeed is the kind of censorship that in the most conserva-
tive view was the target of the constitutional guarantees. But
Emerson's second defense of the rule against prior restraints is
more interesting. Not only is administration of prepublication
restraints easier and more expansive, he argued; it also is more
apt to be effective. By offering speakers or writers the safety of
advance clearance, it permits them to avoid risk and thereby
keeps the forbidden communication from the public. A system
limited to prosecution and punishment after the fact is prefera-
ble because it is less likely to work.5 3
Emerson's argument presents the central paradox of the
rule against prior restraint. The expression which the rule pro-
tects against interference is by hypothesis unlawful expression,
material whose publication will cause harm that cannot be un-
done by a later penalty and that in its substance is not privi-
leged by the constitutional guarantees of free expression. We
choose the preventive effect of testing drugs or airplanes and li-
censing doctors or pilots in preference to the deterrent effect of
manslaughter prosecutions and damage actions. Why not also
in order to prevent harm from unlawful publications? Has not
the press itself demanded prior restraints to protect its
financial interests, as when the International News Service pi-
rated stories reported by the Associated Press?M Emerson ar-
gued, in effect, that in the realm of words and ideas, even
unlawful, punishable expression nevertheless has value under
the Constitution. To put it more pragmatically, if the Constitu-
tion does not foreclose laws against words and ideas altogether,
they might at least be ineffective laws. This defense of the doc-
trine against prior restraints is not easily divorced from one's
view of what expression is or is not constitutionally free from
all governmental restraint.
The "puzzle of prior restraint" was reexamined by Profes-
sor Stephen Barnett5 5 after Nebraska Press Association v. Stu-
53. See generally Emerson, supra note 51, at 656-60.
54. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
55. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L REV. 539 (1977).
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art,56 the 1976 decision in which the Supreme Court relied on
the "presumption" against prior restraints to strike down a gag
order limiting press and broadcast reporting of a criminal case.
Though the entire Court joined in the conclusion, only Justices
Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall were prepared to declare such
orders invalid under any circumstances, while Chief Justice
Burger's majority opinion exhumed the feeblest of all formula-
tions of "clear and present danger" to describe the applicable
test.5 7 But there was a noteworthy difference between Near
and Nebraska Press Association. In Near, it was assumed on
all sides that the libelous content of the Saturday Press was
properly subject to civil and criminal sanctions after publica-
tion. This is what made the Court's ruling against prior re-
straint a famous victory. Had there been constitutional
protection for the substance of the published material, its pub-
lication could not be restrained a fortiori; the Minnesota courts
would have denied the injunction.
In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, on the other hand,
the issue of prior restraints seems to appear in reverse. There
was no assumption that the material in question, information
about the investigation and prosecution of a crime, was outside
the range of freedom of speech and of the press. There was no
law against its eventual publication and (apart from any libel
or invasion of privacy) there could not be. To suggest that a
gag order nevertheless might be valid does not quite say that
only a prior restraint would be permissible, if the "presump-
tion" against it were overcome, but use of the doctrine in this
setting is quite remote from Near v. Minnesota.
This led Professor Barnett to conclude that the only real
56. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
57. The majority opinion employed the following test:
We turn now to the record in this case to determine whether, as
Learned Hand put it, "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its im-
probability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
avoid the danger." United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 [2d Cir.
1950], affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); see also [L. HAND, TH BILL OF RIGHTS]
58-61 (1958). To do so, we must examine the evidence before the trial
judge when the order was entered to determine (a) the nature and ex-
tent of pretrial news coverage; (b) whether other measures would be
likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity; and (c)
how effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the
threatened danger. The precise terms of the restraining order are also
important. We must then consider whether the record supports the en-
try of a prior restraint on publication, one of the most extraordinary
remedies known to our jurisprudence.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 562. The Dennis test was aban-
doned, as a practical matter, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).
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difference between prepublication restraining orders and gen-
eral statutes lay in the rule that one who disobeys such an or-
der, unlike a statute, cannot raise the defense that the original
order was invalid. Once this "collateral bar" rule is abandoned,
at least insofar as the restraining order rests on the content of
the forbidden expression, gag orders against constitutionally
protected expression are impermissible under ordinary free
speech analysis without reference to the doctrine of prior re-
straints. The doctrine would be reserved to prevent prepublica-
tion restraints, as in Near, against expression that may not be
protected against subsequent sanctions.5 8
The best case that can be made for a temporary gag order
is that such an order is not directed at censoring the substance
of the publication but only at its timing, like other regulations
accommodating the "time, place, or manner" of expression to
other important social interests. The commercial compulsions
of the daily and broadcast press toward instant reporting and
its disdain for yesterday's news are not quite synonymous with
its piously claimed duty to inform the public. But an order not
to report the progress of a criminal investigation before trial
may suppress publication not for a few hours but for months.
In fact, when no prosecution ensues, such an order can effec-
tively stifle public inquiry into why it has not.
There is a deeper, more ominous issue in a rule that re-
tains the possibility of gag orders until "the danger" has
passed. Its premise is that there are some things that must be
kept from Americans if they, or some of them, are to do their
jobs as citizens. Nowhere is this premise as appealing as when
we seek to assure a defendant a trial by a jury untainted by
pretrial information. We pride ourselves on the principle that a
person is judged only on evidence presented and subject to re-
buttal in open court, and we select, instruct, and sequester ju-
rors to preserve it; but does the need to preserve the ignorance
of a few allow the government to impose ignorance on all?
Does the importance of keeping information from falling into
the wrong hands justify suppressing information for everyone?
The premise of higher necessity is everywhere the archenemy
of constitutional rights, including freedom of speech and of the
press; once conceded in the interest of fair trials, it can hardly
be confined to that worthy cause. But this premise, too, is a
legacy of Near v. Minnesota.
58. See Barnett, supra note 55, at 551-60.
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B. NEAR'S EXCEPTIONS TO FREEDOM FROM CENSORSHIP
This second legacy of Near v. Minnesota appeared in the
dicta that excluded from its principle two subjects which came
to overshadow the crude libels of the Saturday Press. In view
of its original obscurity and subsequent effects, the passage
needs to be examined as a whole:
The objection has also been made that the principle as to immunity
from previous restraint is stated too broadly, if every such restraint is
deemed to be prohibited. That is undoubtedly true; the protection
even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the limi-
tation has been recognized only in exceptional cases: 'When a nation is
at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hin-
drance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as
men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right' Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52.... No
one would question but that a government might prevent actual ob-
struction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates
of transports or the number and location of troops. On similar grounds,
the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene
publications. The security of the community life may be protected
against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of
orderly government. The constitutional guaranty of free speech does
not 'protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may
have all the effect of force. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221
U.S. 418, 439 .... Schenck v. United States, supra. These limitations
are not applicable here. Nor are we now concerned with questions as
to the extent of authority to prevent publications in order to protect
private rights according to the principles governing the exercise of the
jurisdiction of courts of equity.59
The passage begins as a statement of exceptions to the rule
against previous restraint. But the "exceptional case" cited in
illustration, Schenck v. United States, involved no previous re-
straint; it was a criminal prosecution for urging opposition to
military service in World War I. The quotation from Schenck
and the sentences that follow merged the issue of previous re-
straint with that of constitutional freedom against subsequent
sanctions.
Nor was Schenck authority for excluding the "publication
of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of
troops" from the constitutional freedom of speech and of the
press, which the passage lumped together with "actual obstruc-
tion" to the recruiting of troops as something that the govern-
ment might "prevent." Schenck dealt with the limits of
advocacy, with persuasion to action, akin to the "incitements to
acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly govern-
ment" mentioned later in the same passage. Schenck's ante-
59. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 715-16 (footnotes omitted).
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cedents were in the law of criminal conspiracy and attempts,
not of censorship and secrecy, and the opinion assumed the
existence of a law forbidding the resulting acts or effects. In-
deed, the defendants seemed to admit that they could be pun-
ished if their efforts actually obstructed the recruiting of troops,
and Holmes's conclusion for the Court was that "we perceive
no ground for saying that success alone warrants making the
act a crime." 60
Holmes's opinion in Schenck has been superseded even in
its approach to the limits on advocacy.6 1 But the passage in
Near had no precedent at all for its assumption that newspaper
reporting or public discussion of the government's military op-
erations, as distinct from advocacy or incitement to unlawful
acts, was excluded from freedom of speech and of the press.
The passage was similarly cryptic about the means by which
the government might "prevent" such publication, or "enforce"
what it called "the primary requirements of decency" against
"obscene publications." Presumably the exceptions related to
judicial restraining orders, which otherwise were being ban-
ished as prior restraints. But was this alone intended, on the
doubtful assumption that such orders always assure actual
compliance more than criminal laws? Prior restraints had
other forms: did the Court mean that in the excluded catego-
ries government could choose to "prevent" or "enforce" by the
more effective means of prepublication submission to censor-
ship, by issuing and withdrawing licenses, or by seizing presses
or files? The passage does not say that, but neither does its off-
hand and ill-considered form exclude these implications.
Of the categories which the passage so summarily dis-
missed from constitutional protection, the third, equitable pro-
tection of private rights, was the problem that had occupied
Roscoe Pound. It is something less than governmental censor-
ship insofar as the protective judicial order is sought by a pri-
vate plaintiff, and modern developments in the constitutional
law of defamation, privacy, and commercial speech prevent
such orders against reports or comments on most matters of
public concern. As to Near's dicta about "obscene publica-
tions," Justice Brennan noted as late as 1957, when in his first
year on the Supreme Court he made a 5-4 majority for exclud-
60. Id. at 52. Advocacy of action, in the setting of a strike where it might
have "all the effects of force," was also the issue in Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). In that case the court sustained an injunction.
61. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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ing "obscenity" from freedom of the press, that the question of
such an exclusion in fact had never previously been presented
to the Court.62 The subsequent tragicomic story of this luxuri-
ant specialty of constitutional law is too complex to review
here. After fifteen years' experience with the course on which
he had set the courts, Brennan declared the exclusion of "ob-
scene publications" from liberty of the press to have been an
error, but now he was in dissent.63
It is, however, the first of Near's gratuitous dicta, the sup-
pression of publication on a government's claim of national se-
curity, that has the most far-reaching implications for freedom
of speech and of the press in a democracy. "No one would
question," wrote Chief Justice Hughes, "but that a government
might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and
location of troops." To an experienced reader of legal briefs
and opinions, a phrase like "no one would question" itself sig-
nals a promising target for scrutiny. It typically introduces an
assertion without citation of legal or empirical support. If this
much cited dictum has not been questioned, should it not be?
Is it indeed beyond question, when "prevent" takes the form of
censoring, enjoining, or punishing publication by speech or
press?
Forty years after Near, the eminent Alexander Bickel, ar-
guing for the New York Times against the Government's de-
mand that the courts enjoin publication of the Pentagon
Papers, was not prepared to question the old chestnut when it
was put to him by Justice Stewart.64 As an advocate, he pre-
ferred the easier answer that nothing of the kind was involved
62. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
63. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 103 (1973) (Brennan J.,
dissenting).
64. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
THE COURT [Stewart, J.]: But let me give you a hypothetical case.
Let us assume that when the members of the Court go back and open
up this sealed record, we find something there that absolutely con-
vinces us that its disclosure would result in the sentencing to death of
100 young men whose only offense had been that they were 19 years
old, and had low draft numbers. What should we do?
MR. BICKEL Mr. Justice, I wish there were a statute that covered it.
THE COURT: Well there isn't, we agree-or you submit-so rm asking
in this case, what should we do?
MR. BICKEL rm addressing a case which I am as confident as I can
be of anything, Your Honor will not find that when you get back to
your chambers. It's a hard case. I think it would make bad separation
of powers law, but it's almost impossible to resist the inclination not to
let that information be published, of course.
THE COURT: ... rm posing a case where the disclosure of something
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in the government documents that the Times was publishing.
But the advocate's maneuver that wins a battle often relin-
quishes ground on which to win a war. The implication that an
injunction might hinge on first determining the nature of the
information to be published is a fatal concession when the is-
sue is prior restraint.
The Pentagon Papers Case
The Pentagon Papers themselves were past history, a De-
fense Department study for internal purposes entitled "History
of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy." For
present purposes, I pass by the difference between past and
contemporaneous policy. The Department marked the study to
be kept secret, the administrative device used to control its dis-
tribution and storage so as to prevent its unauthorized dissemi-
nation. When the study nevertheless came into the hands of
the New York Times and the Washington Post, which decided
to put it before their readers, the Government demanded that
federal courts in New York and Washington enjoin these news-
papers from doing so.
In retrospect, we know that the Supreme Court decided
against the Government's claims. The press could mount the
Pentagon Papers case as another trophy between its earlier tri-
umph over Minnesota and its later victory over Nebraska. The
striking fact remains that the constitutional necessity of this
outcome was not so clear to the lower courts as to preclude
temporary restraints of the press. Is it clear after the Pentagon
Papers decision?
The official opinion was a three-paragraph "per curiam"
which merely stated that the Government had not met the
"heavy burden of showing justification" for a prior restraint.
in these files would result in the death of people who were guilty of
nothing.
MR. BICKEL: You're posing me a case, of course, Mr. Justice,... in
which the chain of causation between the act of publication and the
feared event-the death of these 100 young men-is obvious, direct,
immediate-
THE COURT: That's what rm assuming in my hypothetical case.
MR. BICKEL I would only say, as to that, that it is a case in which, in
the absence of the statute, I suppose most of us would say-
THE COURT: You would say the Constitution requires that it be pub-
lished, and that these men die? Is that it?
MR. BICKEL: No. No, rm afraid I'd have-i'm afraid my inclinations
of humanity overcome the somewhat more abstract devotion to the
First Amendment, in a case of that sort.
71 P. KuRiAND & S. CASPER, LANMDmAR BRiEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE
SuPREME COURT OF THE UNrTED STATES: CONSTrTUTIONAL LAw 239-40 (1975).
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That is the announcement of a result, not an analysis, and it
forecloses nothing for the future. Analysis was scattered
through individual opinions of all nine justices. They concern
us here only in tracing the legacy of Near v. Minnesota.
One obvious difference between the suit brought to the
Minnesota trial court in Near and the Federal Government's
suits to enjoin the New York Times and Washington Post might
have been enough to dispose of the Pentagon Papers cases. It
is the old and elementary difference between the courts' role in
enforcing a law and making a law. Minnesota's legislature had
made it a law that anyone who published a malicious, scandal-
ous, and defamatory newspaper was guilty of a public nuisance
and should be enjoined from continuing it. State and federal
constitutional guarantees entered the case only in their normal
role as outer limits on the permissible reach of law. Within
those limits, Minnesota's courts had to apply Minnesota's law,
not make it.
In the Pentagon Papers case, however, the federal attor-
neys could cite no law prohibiting the press from publishing
government documents or other information about national de-
fense activities. Justice Douglas pointed out that Congress had
rejected a version of the Espionage Act that would have author-
ized the President to proclaim such a prohibition and instead
limited the act to conventional espionage communications. 65
Certainly Congress had not directed courts to enjoin errant
newspapers, as Minnesota had. The Times and the Post broke
no law and could not be punished, if the courts did not first
make such a law. Although dicta in some of the nine opinions
got sidetracked into questions about inherent presidential
power, the President had not attempted to enjoin the newspa-
pers by executive order, as President Truman had tried to seize
the steel mills. 66 What the Government asked of the courts was
not to apply a law but to supply one. For Justice Marshall that
was enough to dispose of the case.67 In a somewhat different
vein Justice Stewart suggested that it was up to the executive
to maintain confidentiality within its own ranks without calling
on the courts to perform that function.68
Why, then, should a court invoke the liberty of the press
and the rule against prior restraints? In part, no doubt, refer-
65. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 721, 722 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
66. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
67. 403 U.S. at 740-48 (Marshall, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 727-30 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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ence to the first amendment is almost reflexive in any legal ac-
tion against the press, so much so that a favorable decision on
other grounds might be taken as a sinister hint. The familiar
doctrine furnished easy common ground for the per curiam an-
nouncement of the Court's holding. But the first amendment is
cast in an ambiguous role when there is no law to be tested for
constitutionality.
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press," states the first amendment; nor the
freedom, one might add where discussion of government is con-
cerned, "to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances." Here, Congress had made no such law. If the
government had claimed the authority of a law, a court's duty
would be to determine whether the law Congress had made
abridged the freedom of speech, or of the press, or of petition.
The question would not be whether some other law that Con-
gress had not made might meet the government's objective.
To begin a case with the question how much abridgment
the first amendment permits, on the other hand, implicitly as-
sumes that the law extends to whatever restraint the amend-
ment does not preclude. 69 When the executive requests an
injunction without a law to enforce, it asks the court to become
a partner in government, a throwback to the King's chancellors
of the days before lawmaking became the business of elected
representatives. The first amendment also is not the first or
sole question of the lawfulness of court orders to suppress pre-
trial disclosures. When a court takes on the role of lawmaker
for a perceived need, it no longer confronts the amendment as
basic law limiting the power of others, but rather as a fetter on
the court's own power to accomplish what it deems necessary.
That is not the most promising perspective for first amendment
doctrine.
Implications of the National Security Exception
Suppose, however, that Congress made a law prohibiting
the press from publishing information which the government
declares to be secret? Would it not be a law "abridging the
freedom of the press?" Surely the sophistry that what such a
law restrains is the press but not part of the freedom of the
press too patently begs the question. Does the first amend-
ment nevertheless permit such a law simply because it is un-
69. The same fallacy is almost universal in the jurisprudence of arrests
and searches under the fourth amendment.
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thinkable that it does not-because, in Near's words, no one
would question it? Or could another Alexander Bickel meet
the Near dictum head-on, if the occasion demanded it?
Although on that occasion it proved unnecessary, a number
of troubling questions seem to me to invite thought about the
unthinkable.
First, it is important to distinguish between breach of se-
crecy and publication. The unauthorized transmission of confi-
dential information (more dramatically phrased as
"intelligence" and "espionage") is not publication; normally it
is itself kept secret. Whatever dangers such breaches of se-
crecy pose, if some overriding danger is claimed as the basis of
denying first amendment protection to publication, then the
consequences of publication, not the consequences of a breach
of secrecy, must have been the object of the legislative enact-
ment, and they must be shown to be real. In this sense, "publi-
cation of the sailing dates of transports or the number and
location of troops" was not the best example. Perhaps it is not
inconceivable that an enemy might first learn such information
from reading it in the Times. It seems more likely that when
the press has the information, its secrecy already cannot be re-
lied on, and publication may only alert the government to that
fact. Thus a more relevant example is the government's effort
to suppress information usable for making atomic weapons, in-
formation which is no secret to other governments, hostile as
well as friendly, but which each wants to keep out of "danger-
ous" hands. In the Pentagon Papers case, the fear that the gov-
ernment would appear unable to keep its secrets was itself
claimed, rather circularly, to be an overriding danger from pub-
lication. The more information about its international actions
the government can successfully suppress at home, the more
effective it will appear, and hence be, abroad. Jefferson and
Madison would appreciate this logic more as diplomats than as
sponsors of the first amendment.70
Second, a doctrine that grave dangers threatened by publi-
cation can override the first amendment must face the test of
its own effectiveness. "Prevent," in the Near dictum, cannot
stop with penal laws and restraining orders if prevention of
70. Chief Justice Hughes had been Secretary of State from 1921 to 1925.
His successful opponent in the 1916 presidential election, Woodrow Wilson,
once called for "open covenants, openly arrived at," and Henry Stimson, Secre-
tary of State at the time of Near v. Minnesota, thought of codebreaking that
"gentlemen do not read each other's mail." Of course, these men's views are
now recognized as quaintly naive.
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overriding danger is the premise. These may not silence one
who believes it crucial to make public what he or she knows.
Moreover, their reach is limited. If the American press is muz-
zled despite the first amendment, another Daniel Ellsberg may
take his Pentagon Papers to Montreal or Paris. Books about
the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency may be pub-
lished in London or Stockholm. Americans may have to smug-
gle such reports home, as they once did the novels of Henry
Miller, or listen to the British Broadcasting Corporation to find
out about their own government as some other people must.
But if the secrecy that is said to justify all this nevertheless
will not be assured, the justification would seem to fall with it.
Most important, to suppress public reporting of govern-
ment acts and policies in the name of security also means sup-
pressing the political means of affecting those acts and policies.
The ships that are about to sail may be headed for the Bay of
Pigs. The troops may secretly have been sent to Cambodia, in
numbers and locations wholly unknown to and unapproved by
the Congress. The scenario by which to test Near's dicta is not
disclosure of military secrets to aid an enemy in a declared
war; that has separate constitutional status as treason.71 The
critical test, rather, is to posit that a public leader, let us say a
Senator, is given confidential information that he believes to be
credible and that deeply disturbs him about the government's
course of conduct.
Assume, though it has little relevance, that the Senator
makes quiet attempts to pursue this information which are met
with assertions of secrecy in the interests of national security
the subject is "classified." The matter strikes him as so impor-
tant that he decides to make a speech about what he has been
told, in or outside the Senate. Can any law that prohibits this
speech, or that would enjoin the press from reporting and dis-
cussing it, pass muster under the first amendment? Perhaps
the informant broke some law; possibly the Senator may be
censured by the Senate;7 2 but surely press coverage of their
71. U.S. CONST. art. DI, § 3:
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War
ainst them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and
mfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testi-
mony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open
Court.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Trea-
son, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or
Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attained.
72. Compare Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (restricting a staff
1981]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
disclosures could not constitutionally be punished as a crime,
or as contempt, or suppressed by seizing a press run or a
broadcast tape, even if they disclosed the most closely guarded
secret.73
Perhaps it is this scenario that in the past has given Con-
gress pause in enacting such secrecy laws. But the first amend-
ment question does not hinge on the hypothetical speaker's
membership in the Congress; he or she might be a candidate, a
professor, a clergyman, an editor, or anyone. A prohibition
against publicly describing what the government is doing is a
prohibition against effectively urging that it change its course.
Countless illustrations can be imagined. An engineer may
be convinced that the ships which are about to sail are certain
death traps for the troops and should be stopped.74 A scientist
on the Manhattan project might be shocked that radioactive
wastes are secretly placed where they endanger unknowing
people and decide that he must warn the community.75 An air
force chaplain might learn to his horror that one bomber crew
is scheduled to incinerate an entire city and think an attempt
to stop it to be his sacred duty. A breakthrough in medicine
can provide as much military advantage as a new weapon, but
the doctor whose laboratory develops a lifesaving antibiotic
might not honor the government's command to keep the discov-
ery a military secret.76 Perhaps the government might con-
member's reliance on the "speech and debate clause," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl.
1, to oppose a grand jury subpoena after Senator Mike Gravel placed Pentagon
Papers in a committee record and arranged for their private republication),
with Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (reversing the exclusion of Julian Bond
from the Georgia House of Representatives for statements opposing Vietnam
policy).
73. In Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), Justice Douglas stated
that the first amendment would protect Beacon Press in publishing the Penta-
gon Papers after Senator Gravel had placed them into an official record of Con-
gress, regardless whether or not the Senator or his aide acted within the
"speech or debate clause," of the Constitution. 408 U.S. at 633 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
74. In Bertolt Brecht's Threepenny Novel, rotten ships sold to the British
Admiralty by a corrupt syndicate for use as troop transports sink in the English
Channel within hours of leaving port. B. BRECHT, THREEPENNY NOVEL 38-44
(Bernard Hanison ltd. ed. 1938).
75. See, e.g., Big Atom Waste Site Reported Found Near Buffalo, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 1, 1981, at 1, coL 1.
76. Another example of government efforts to censor academic or other re-
search and theories developed entirely independently of the government is the
contemporary attempt of the National Security Agency to suppress crypto-
graphic research papers, so far by "voluntary" agreement. See Witt, Advances
in Cryptography Press Issues of Computer Privacy, LA Times, May 16, 1981, at
1A, coL 1.
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clude that the internment of a potentially hostile minority of
enemy aliens had best be declared classified national security
information, but the facts become known to a lawyer who pro-
ceeds to challenge the internment. An intelligence analyst
learns that professional killers for organized crime whom gov-
ernment prosecutors have sought to put behind bars have
secretly been recruited for undercover "security operations"
and publicly denounces this arrangement, identifying the se-
cret agents and their past criminal records. 77 A cabinet officer
resigns in order to oppose secret plans to invade another coun-
try. Another provides information about an impending new
weapons technology, without going through the declassification
process. 78
Any of these disclosures might be dangerous half-truths,
motivated by self-righteous arrogance or political ambition, and
might in fact cause real harm. The speakers, on the other hand,
may turn Holmes's test for suppression around and insist that
clear and present danger demands immediate public exposure.
Does the first amendment permit the government to punish the
publication of such disclosures-in a republic which conducts
elections in the midst of wars, including a great civil war, and
which would be at a loss how to continue legitimate govern-
ment without them?
As first amendment doctrine has developed, the Supreme
Court's preferred answer is that it all depends. On its face, of
course, the amendment is directed at the national lawmakers
and, in consequence, at officials who claim the authority of law
for their acts. It tells them that a law abridging freedom of
speech or of the press is beyond their powers when it is pro-
posed or adopted, and no such abridgment can claim the au-
thority of law. When constitutional law came to be equated
with judicial review, to be conceived as law for courts rather
than as law for government in advance of judicial review, most
of its formulas were transmuted from rules designed to be ob-
served when governments make or administer law into meta-
phors of balancing and adjectives of degree that describe only
the process of case-by-case adjudication. That focus produces
only formulas which will leave courts to reach whichever deci-
77. See S. 2216, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); HR. 5615, 96th Cong, 2d Sess.
(1980). This bill, entitled "Intelligence Identities Protection Act" was intro-
duced to prohibit disclosure of CIA agents.
78. See HOUSE CouN. ON ARmED SERVICES, INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMM. RE-
PORT, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEAKS OF CLASSIFIED NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMA-
mON-STEALTH AmcRAFT (Comm. Print 1981).
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sion they consider right under the circumstances. In first
amendment doctrine, the most famous of these elastic formulas
is the test of overriding danger.
The Pentagon Papers case should make clear that this ap-
proach to the first amendment is self-defeating when the publi-
cation of secrets is claimed to pose the overriding danger.
Former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold later described in an
entertaining speech the conditions under which the issue
whether to censor two of the nation's greatest newspapers was
argued and decided.79 When Griswold was called upon to ar-
gue for the government in the Court of Appeals, he knew noth-
ing of what was in the Pentagon study or why the Government
thought its publication needed to be suppressed. Neither he
nor counsel for the newspapers had seen the study. The secur-
ity guard who later delivered the forty-seven volumes to Gris-
wold's office objected that the Solicitor General's secretary had
no security clearance. The Solicitor General prepared a secret
brief to the Supreme Court while his deputy wrote an open
brief. The security guard was troubled that the secret brief
would be filed with the Court's Clerk, who also might have no
security clearance. When Griswold insisted on giving copies to
counsel for the newspapers, he later learned that the security
guard retrieved them immediately after the argument. If the
danger of public disclosure is really the issue in litigation,
what, in all seriousness, should we expect if the Government
sought to disqualify a Justice whose views on the subject pre-
clude his either wanting a security clearance or getting one?
Griswold showed the inescapable contradiction in an ex-
ception of dangerous secrets from the rule against prior re-
straints when he stated:-
Let me say this... one of the reasons that the cases were started in
the first place was that there was nobody in the Department of Justice
who knew anything whatever about what was in them or who had ever
heard of the Pentagon Papers before the New York Times started to
print them. And so the real objective of starting the suit was simply to
say 'For God's sake, give us time to find out what this is all about' 8 0
For exactly this reason, as long as the rule against prior re-
straints has such an exception, many judges will feel obliged to
react in the same way by restraining the press to preserve the
status quo. Judge Gurfein enjoined the New York Times for
four days before deciding that it could continue publication of
79. Griswold, Teaching Alone Is Not Enough, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 251, 255-58
(1973).
80. Id. at 257-58.
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the Pentagon Papers.81 Judge Warren felt similarly obliged by
the Near dictum to restrain The Progressive magazine from
publishing an article on making a hydrogen bomb.82 But to
maintain the status quo means to forbid publication while a hi-
erarchy of courts, on the basis of a secret record presented in
secret proceedings, speculates on the likelihood of adverse ef-
fects from publication and their magnitude.83 It means a prior
restraint in order to decide that a prior restraint is unconstitu-
tional, as in the Pentagon Papers case. This contradiction was
apparent to Justice Brennan, but even he shied from con-
fronting the Near dictum head on. Only Justice Black, joined
by Justice Douglas, was ready to proclaim that the emperor
wore no clothes.84
81. United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
82. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 996 (W.D. Wis.), ap-
peal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979); see Knoll, National Security: The
Ultimate Threat to the First Amendment, 66 MINN. L. REv. 161 (1981). The case
was thoughtfully analyzed in two student notes: Note, United States v. Progres-
sive, Inc.: The Faustian Bargain and the First Amendment, 75 Nw. U. L. REv.
538 (1980); Note, United States v. Progressive, Inc.: The National Security and
Free Speech Conflict, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141 (1980). Both assumed that the
decision whether or not to forbid publication required a factual inquiry by the
trial court. Of course, this in turn would require a preliminary order against
publication pending the decision.
If such an order does not deter the publisher, can he be punished for con-
tempt if the publication otherwise could not be punished? See Barnett, supra
note 55, at 551-53.
83. The Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat.
2025 (1980) (Title 18), directed the Chief Justice to prescribe rules to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of classified information used in federal criminal trials.
Procedures promulgated in February, 1981, call for the designation of a "court
security officer" to take charge both of classified documents and of "secure
quarters" for hearings concerning classified information, and they forbid access
to the evidence by any person (other than jurors) without a security clearance.
Defense counsel is entitled to access to classified evidence only under the
terms of a protective order. 49 U.S.L.W. 2540 (1981).
84. I adhere to the view that the Government's case against the Wash-
ington Post should have been dismissed and that the injunction against
the New York Times should have been vacated without oral argument
when the cases were first presented to this Court. I believe that every
moment's continuance of the injunctions against these newspapers
amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the
First Amendment. Furthermore, after oral argument, I agree com-
pletely that we must affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit and reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit for the reasons stated by my Broth-
ers DOUGLAS and BRENNAN. In my view it is unfortunate that some
of my Brethren are apparently willing to hold that the publication of
news may sometimes be enjoined. Such a holding would make a sham-
bles of the First Amendment.
Our Government was launched in 1789 with the adoption of the
Constitution. The Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment, fol-
lowed in 1791. Now, for the first time in the 182 years since the found-
ing of the Republic, the federal courts are asked to hold that the First
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VI. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A LIMIT ON LAWS
This review of the antecedents of Near v. Minnesota and its
legacy has focused more on the weakness of premises than on
apparently successful outcomes. It has taken the formulas of
judicial opinions seriously, perhaps more seriously than they
deserve, because lawyers and judges are trained to take these
formulas seriously, and therefore so will legislators, attorneys
general, and district attorneys-and the lawyers who advise
newspaper publishers.8 5
To summarize: State judges early reduced the declarations
of freedom of speech and of the press adopted in the era of the
Revolution to mere restatements of English rights against li-
censing and prepublication censorship. They denied these dec-
larations any effect to limit the judges' own powers to define
and to punish common law crimes and contempts. Thus liberty
of the press came to imply no protection against subsequent
penalties for any substantive content that a state legislature or
a state court might regard as an "abuse" of the freedom from
prior controls.
After adoption of the fourteenth amendment, an eminent
common law judge, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., read this same
restrictive doctrine into the clause forbidding states to abridge
"liberty" without due process of law. 86 Since the process fol-
lowed by the states was not the issue, "due process" in any
event was only a court-fashioned tool against "unreasonable"
abridgments of liberty. Burdened with the illogic of its contro-
versial use against ordinary legislation, the due process clause
at best could provide only a relative balancing of free expres-
sion against other social values.
Again, when appellants convicted under federal laws in-
voked the first amendment, Holmes wrote for the Court that
"clear and present danger" of actual harm from a defendant's
advocacy could override freedom of speech and press, although
the first amendment in terms is addressed to Congress at the
time it makes a law, not at the time and circumstances of the
Amendment does not mean what it says, but rather means that the
Government can halt the publication of current news of vital impor-
tance to the people of this country.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 714-15.
85. UNGAR, THE PAPERs AND THE PAPEns 97-98, 121-22, 138-47 (1st ed. 1972),
presents a telling description of the legal advice given the New York Times and
the Washington Post against publishing the Pentagon Papers.
86. Patterson v. Colorado ex reL Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
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speech or publication.87 In this fashion judicial doctrine shifted
the legal meaning of freedom of expression from a limitation on
government back to what judges know best, the relative assess-
ment of facts in case-by-case adjudication. It led to formulas of
'presumptions" and "balancing" and battles over adjectives
and adverbs--"heavy" presumptions, uimminent" and "ex-
treme" danger-that remain with us to this day.
Was another approach possible? In constitutional theory it
was and remains possible, though historically it was aborted by
the Court of the post-Reconstruction era.
Not only the first amendment but the states' guarantees of
freedom to speak and to write could have been understood, as
they now are, to go beyond Blackstone and to protect freedom
of expression after as well as before the fact. The first amend-
ment could be read as it is written, first to bar the enactment of
federal laws directed in terms against speech and press, and
only second to protect rights of expression against the applica-
tion of otherwise valid laws. A law directed in express terms
against advocating overthrow of the government or publishing
a suspect's confession or against publicly burning draft cards in
protest against a war is on its face a law to suppress expres-
sion by virtue of its content. A law against violence or interfer-
ing with a trial or a law requiring possession of a draft card is
not.88 The fourteenth amendment, in turn, could be read to
hold the states to respecting the same "privileges and immuni-
ties" of citizenship that the first amendment and the remainder
of the Bill of Rights guaranteed against the federal government,
which would include immunity from state laws directed in
terms against speech and press.89 This reading of the constitu-
tional texts has an honorable lineage in the opinions of the first
Justice Harlan, Justice Brandeis, and Justice Black.
There is a profound difference between reading the first
amendment as it is written, as a limitation on permissible laws,
87. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
88. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
89. To avoid misunderstanding- This refers to laws directed in terms
against any communicative content of speech or of the press of a kind which
under any circumstances would fall within the constitutional meaning of free
expression. It does not refer to conventional crimes and torts involving words,
such as fraud, extortion, larceny by trick, blackmail, or modern statutory
equivalents, nor to the use of words to attempt, solicit, and conspire to commit
a crime. See Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 Am. B. FOUNDATION RE-
SEARCH J. 647; Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in
the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970).
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and reading it only to provide legal immunity when an individ-
ual is found entitled to it in the concrete situation. The per-
spective that the first amendment protects "rights" focuses a
court's attention on the individual's conduct-what a speaker
or writer has said or written, what a publisher intends to pub-
lish, and whether it exceeds the bounds of constitutional privi-
lege. The perspective that the first amendment limits
government, in contrast, places the focus first on what govern-
ment has done or intends to do-on whether it means to make
or enforce a law designed to abridge free expression. Only
when the law passes that test is there occasion to reach the
question whether to apply it in a specific case would put the
law afoul of the first amendment.
It also is profoundly important whether governmental ac-
tion against speech or press is based on a valid preexisting law,
not for the sake of prior notice, but because the principle of
lawmaking by elected representatives generally is important in
a democracy. A bill proposed in Congress to protect the secur-
ity of military operations, or in a state legislature to protect the
fairness of trials, is open to scrutiny and debate by others than
the parties to a single case. Its terms will threaten the rights of
many rather than a specified few, if it is not to fail as a bill of
attainder.90 If its terms forbid publishing specified types of
content, the bill proposes a law abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press, and legislators may oppose it as such or
amend it so as to be constitutional. If legislators rush an un-
constitutional bill into law in a fit of righteous indignation or
patriotic fervor, others may seek office proposing to repeal the
law or to let it lapse, as the infamous Sedition Act of 1798 was
permitted to lapse. In many states the bill may be subjected to
a referendum. In short, the principle of no suppression without
a valid preexisting law makes censorship a political issue
before it becomes a judicial issue.
None of this is true of a court order. A legislator or a candi-
date cannot easily propose to repeal a law that censors the
press when the order that forbids publication is based on no
law. The press might seek enactment of statutes affirmatively
ending gag orders, just as statutes were needed to open public
records and public meetings and to extend a measure of protec-
tion to a journalist's sources and files. Just a few months after
the Supreme Court in Near pronounced its ban on injunctions
90. See U.S. CONST. arL I, §§ 9, 10; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315
(1946).
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against the press, Congress enacted an equally famous ban on
injunctions against another group-the ban on labor injunc-
tions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.9 ' To repeat, the law of the
press is not synonymous with the first amendment, and the
courts are not the only source of that law.
It seems anomalous, a century and a half after common law
crimes were replaced by statutory criminal law, that so impor-
tant and controversial a policy as gag orders against press re-
ports of matters of public interest should be thought authorized
without a law. The anomaly was apparent to several Justices in
the Pentagon Papers case. It is not equally apparent to state
courts when they come to protect their own function, the con-
duct of trials, rather than some executive function like the con-
duct of negotiations.
The Minnesota court's order against Near and his cohorts,
of course, did rest on a statute. The Minnesota courts were ap-
plying a law, not fashioning one for the case at hand. If the first
amendment is understood to bar the enactment of certain
kinds of laws, if it focuses first on denying government certain
powers before focusing on anyone's individual rights, then the
crucial first amendment question is what kind of laws govern-
ment may not make, in the form of statutes, or ordinances, or
administrative rules, or executive or judicial orders, as a legal
basis for adverse action against speech or press.
This crucial question cannot be answered with judicial for-
mulas phrased so as to hinge decisions on the circumstances of
individual cases. A formula based on danger at the time of
publication will not serve as a test for the validity of a law at
the time of enactment, and to let a legislature simply declare at
the time of enactment that certain publications always are in-
trinsically dangerous equally makes the test useless. 92 Neither
can such vague concepts as "national security" provide an ade-
quate distinguishing test of laws abridging freedom of speech
and of the press, especially if the same mode of analysis is to
serve for state laws. The pursuit of "national security" consists
of thousands of discrete governmental acts, any of which may
well be highly debatable for legitimate reasons.93 Many such
91. Act of March 23, 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70.
92. Deference to such an estimate by the New York legislature in 1902, af-
ter the assassination of President McKinley, 23 years later led to affirmance of
a conviction for "criminal anarchy" under totally different circumstances, in
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
93. A provocative article entitled Taxonomy of Principal Foreign Affairs
Secrets listing the reasons, good or bad, for withholding secrets from foreign or
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acts have analogues in the states that are not easily denied
equal claims to censorship. A state may have reason to fear
more actual danger from an article showing how to make a gas-
oline bomb than how to make an atomic bomb. If the first
amendment permits enactment of a federal law punishing pub-
lication of the names of intelligence agents, why not also of FBI
agents, or a state law punishing identification of narcotics
officers?94
Many other untimely publications can harm public objec-
tives, such as disclosure of an impending devaluation of the
dollar, or of a decision on the location of a highway exit, or of
the correct answers to an examination. If the first amendment
permits enactment of laws punishing publication of some of
these reports but not others, the judicial formulas interpreting
the amendment must be designed to tell lawmakers what kinds
of laws the amendment permits or forbids. Before formulating
tests of free expression under concrete circumstances, an inter-
pretation of the first amendment must face the question
whether a law directed in terms against the content of expres-
sion can avoid being a law abridging the freedom of speech or
of the press, if the content is of a kind that under any circum-
stances would fall within the meaning of the first amendment.9 5
The same is true for the interpretation of equivalent guaran-
tees in the state constitutions.96
domestic knowledge is found in L FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, SECRECY AND FOR-
EIGN PoLIcy 410-11 (1974). See generally Henkin, The Right to Know and the
Duty to Withhold The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L, REV. 271
(1971).
94. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE (West Supp. 1980) § 146e:
Every person who maliciously, and with the intent to obstruct justice
or the due administration of the laws, publishes, disseminates, or
otherwise discloses the residence address or telephone number of any
peace officer while designating the peace officer as such, without the
authorization of the agency which employs such peace officer, is guilty
of a misdemeanor.
95. See Linde, supra note 89, at 1174-75.
96. A recent decision invalidating a law against "abusive or obscene lan-
guage" under Oregon's guarantee of free expression, see note 20 supra, stated-
This constitutional provision is a prohibition on the legislative
branch. It prohibits the legislature from enacting laws restraining the
free expression of opinion or restricting the right to speak freely on
any subject. If a law concerning free speech on its face violates this
prohibition, it is unconstitutional; it is not necessary to consider what
the conduct is in the individual case.
... [The statute] is directed at the expression or the speech.
There may be types of 'expression' that would not be within the protec-
tion of Art. L § 8 under any imaginable circumstances. But when the
terms of a statute as written prohibit or restrain expression that does
come within this protection, the statute is a law forbidden by Art. I, § 8.
State v. Spencer, 289 Or. 225, 228, 611 P.2d 1147, 1148-49 (1980).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The history of liberty of the press in the United States is
not the history of the first amendment. Many factors other
than constitutional protection explain the wide freedom of
printed expression, at least, from governmental interference.
One of them is federalism, the same federalism that the
Supreme Court overcame in Near v. Minnesota to extend four-
teenth amendment "liberty" of speech and of the press
throughout the states. It is impossible as a practical matter for
one state to maintain effective censorship among the porous le-
gal compartments of a larger nation, as was recently illustrated
when English threats against publication of a guide to commit-
ting suicide shifted its publication into Scotland.9 7
Nonetheless the role of the first amendment has been im-
portant, perhaps as much for what it is believed to do as for
what it does. A modest skepticism of its effectiveness under
pressure runs from Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and
Thomas Jefferson to Judge Learned Hand and Justice Robert
H. Jackson.98 The first amendment is indispensable as myth,
but when it fails as myth, it must prove indispensable as law.
Under what circumstances it will prove so remains unfinished
business.
In Near v. Minnesota, the Supreme Court assumed that lib-
erty of the press did not mean freedom from penalties for pub-
lishing materials that lawmakers reasonably might suppress.
That answer was not an interpretation of the first amendment,
and it has not survived as an interpretation of the first amend-
ment. But the Court also decided that liberty of the press de-
nies lawmakers the use of prior restraints, including the use of
statutory injunctions, to suppress publication even of materials
that might not be privileged against subsequent penalties. Sad-
died from birth with qualifying dicta, this doctrine too was later
reduced to a "heavy presumption," in the kind of judicial
formula by which courts reserve to themselves the power of fu-
ture judgments. Nevertheless, the doctrine against prior re-
97. After "Exit," a British euthanasia society, decided to withdraw a sui-
cide guide that might have been a violation for "counseling" suicide under the
Suicide Act of 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 60, which applies to England and Wales, the
Scottish branch of the society decided to proceed with publication. Letter from
Office of Legal Attache, American Embassy, London, to Ronald Collins (Sep-
tember 29, 1980) (on fie at the Minnesota Law Review).
98. Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and The Free Press, 9 HoraTRA L
REv. 1, 28-33 (1980).
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straints remains a powerful taboo. For this, Near v. Minnesota
deserves a cheer.
The search remains for formulas that explain what kind of
laws the first amendment forbids lawmakers to enact for the
suppression of speech or writing by virtue of its content, formu-
las for the constitutionality of laws antecedent to the circum-
stances of any particular publication. This view of the first
amendment or of its equivalents in the states has not been a
familiar or congenial perspective for case-oriented courts; yet
why should it not be? It is the essence of constitutional law
that it focuses on the actions of government, not on the actions
of private parties. If government acts without a basis in a valid
law, the court need not find facts or weigh circumstances in the
individual case. When a constitutional prohibition is addressed
to lawmakers, as the first amendment is, the role that it assigns
to courts is the censorship of laws, not participation in govern-
ment censorship of private expression. This, I suggest, is not
an inappropriate relation between courts and censorship.
